Aids to Statutory Interpretation – Presumptions and Rules of Language

In my last blog post, we looked at the intrinsic and extrinsic aids that can be used to interpret the law if it is unclear or simply being applied to a novel situation. We also considered what the four rules are that can be used in statutory interpretation, which are literal, golden, mischief and the purposive approach. In this week’s blog post, we will still be thinking about statutory interpretation, but this time we will focus on the four presumptions that can be made by the court and the rules of language used to interpret statutes. 

However, we will start by quickly reviewing what statutory interpretation is and why it has to be used by courts. Statutory interpretation is used where there is no clear meaning of a statute. This can be because the wording is vague, there is a situation that Parliament might not have considered when drafting the statute or there are new developments (such as technology) that were not a consideration when the statute was first created. The court will then need to decide what Parliament meant and how to apply the statute to the current case. 

Presumptions 

There are several presumptions that the courts will apply to every statute when a case is unclear. These can help to reduce uncertainty. However, if there is something in the statute itself that contradictions a presumption, then this presumption is said to be rebutted and will not be used for interpretation. One presumption is against change in common law. It is always assumed that the common law (from decided cases) will apply unless specifically stated otherwise in the statute. 

There is also the presumption that a statute will not bind the Crown unless it specifically says it does. This will include ministers as well and gives them immunity from statutes. 

Another presumption is that there must be mens rea in criminal cases. This means “guilty mind” and requires that the defendant was acting with intent to cause harm or recklessness as to whether harm resulted from their actions. There are exceptions to this called strict liability offences (such as some motoring offences) but this is clearly stated in the relevant statute. 

In addition, there is a presumption that no statute will apply retrospectively, meaning that someone can’t be put on trial for an offence that did not exist when they did it. This would create a lot of unfair situations and mean that no one could ever rely on the law, even if they had checked it before they did (or didn’t do) a particular act. There are some rare exceptions to this, such as the War Crimes Act 1991, but it must be specifically stated in the Act that this is the case before it is passed as law. 

Rules of Language 

There are three different rules of language which can be used to help interpret statutes. The first of these is noscitur a sociis, which means “it is known by its associates”. If it is uncertain what a particular word should be taken to mean and include, judges can look at the context and try to figure out the intention behind it in this way. This can help to avoid absurd outcomes or just serve to clarify the law. Sometimes the whole of the statute may be looked at to determine the meaning, while at other times just the sentence or list the word is in will be sufficient. 

The second rule is expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other. Essentially, specifically mentioning one thing means that others are excluded just by not being mentioned. For example, a list that names certain things or situations can lead to other things not on the list being excluded from the law. 

In the case of R v Inhabitants of Sedgley (1831) 2 B & Ad 65, it was decided that the list “lands, houses and coalmines” specifically mentioned coalmines, so other sorts of mines were excluded from the statute. 

The third and final rule is ejusdem generis, which means “of the same kind”. This means that if a statute gives a list of specific words that can only apply to one type of thing, any general words that follow this should be taken to refer to the same thing. 

For example, the case of Powell v Kempton (1899) AC 143 had a list that mentioned the terms “house, office, room or other place”. Due to the preceding words, “other place” was taken to mean an indoor place, so a ring at a racecourse was excluded. 

Wrapping Up 

I hope that this helps you to understand some of the presumptions and rules that judges can use when they’re deciding how to treat a case. In my next blog post, we will be looking at precedents and obiter dicta statements, so come back in two weeks for that!

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